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In a model of price competition single-product ¯rms compete for consumers.
Consumers purchase a variable quantity of one of the di®erentiated goods. The
paper provides results on equilibrium existence when consumers are heterogeneous
in their evaluation of the di®erentiated goods among each other, their evaluation of
the di®erentiated goods relative to the outside good, and heterogeneous in income.
Furthermore, I provide su±cient conditions for dominance solvability and monotone
comparative statics.
KEYWORDS: Price Competition; Imperfect Competition; Heterogeneous De-
mand; Oligopoly Theory; Product Di®erentiation.
21 Introduction
Consider a di®erentiated oligopoly with a ¯nite number of one-product ¯rms com-
peting in prices. It is known since the work of Roberts and Sonnenschein (1977)
that there are robust non-existence results of Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Suppose that there exists a market with two types of consumers characterized by
their individual demand function. Even if equilibrium existence can be shown in any
market with a single type of consumers non-existence might result in the presence
of two types. The problem of non-existence of equilibrium is due to a lack of restric-
tions derived for market, i.e. aggregate, demand. The lack of restrictions on market
demand can be seen as the most fundamental problem in establishing a general
theory of price competition in partial equilibrium. A foundation of imperfect com-
petition then consists of the analysis of models which go beyond a representative
consumer speci¯cation or particular examples with heterogeneous consumers and
which address and partially resolve the problem. Given the importance of imperfect
competition in ¯elds such as industrial organization, international trade, economic
geography, and regional science such models and the insights they provide might be
of interest to a wide audience.
In order to establish existence of equilibrium previous work has concentrated on
models in which the best response correspondences of the ¯rms are convex-valued.
In the framework of discrete choice with unit demand or unit elastic demand, posi-
tive results have been obtained by Caplin and Nalebu® (1991b), Dierker (1991), and
Peitz (1997). The theme of their and my paper is that distributional assumptions
can generate strong regularities of aggregate demand. The main contribution of this
paper is to avoid functional form assumptions on individual demand and to show
the existence of equilibrium in a heterogeneous population.
Discrete choice means that each consumer chooses only one out of a set of di®er-
entiated goods and is an interesting case which applies to a wide range of consumer
goods, for which consumers do not have a preference for variety (for an exploration
of discrete choice models of product di®erentiation see Anderson, de Palma, and
Thisse, 1992). A consumer in my model buys only one type of good in a market
depending on the relative prices between the goods. The quantity which consumers
buy depends on the relevant price. Consumers are heterogeneous in three respects:
3(1) they have di®erent critical relative prices when one good becomes more valuable
than another, (2) their demand functions for each good conditional on buying the
particular good di®er between consumers and (3) they have di®erent income. To
model demand heterogeneity I take Grandmont's (1993) parametrization of demand.
Demand heterogeneity is split into two parts: consumers have di®erent rescaling pa-
rameters of the units of measurement compared to a base type and there exist
di®erent base types in the population. Grandmont has shown that heterogeneity of
demand behavior with respect to a parameter gives rise to aggregate demand which
is \close" to unit elastic demand, i.e. the price sensitivity of market expenditure is
small. Note that a market in which total expenditure reacts rather insensitive to
price changes makes the partial equilibrium modeling attractive. This regularity of
the aggregate will turn out to be important in my model of price competition.
Since consummers can switch between the di®erentiated goods, total expendi-
ture on a single di®erentiated goods can react very sensitive to price changes. The
heterogeneity in the discrete choice between the di®erentiated goods is character-
ized by a log-concave density over switching points (following Caplin and Nalebu®,
1991b, and Dierker, 1991). This restriction is useful and encompasses a wide range
of density function (see section 2). In the model strengthening the assumption on
the concavity of switching parameters allows for less heterogeneous demand behav-
ior, which means that aggregate demand is further away from the unit-elastic case.
Income heterogeneity in my model will not place restrictions on aggregate demand
but in contrast to models with unit demand does not lead to problems of equilibrium
e x i s t e n c e( s e eP e i t z ,1 9 9 9 ) .
I interpret the model as a model of short-run competition in prices. The property
that the di®erentiated goods are not perfect substitutes in the aggregate is due to
the heterogeneity of switching points of the consumers. This heterogeneity can be
explained by intrinsic di®erences in tastes (as in the literature on product di®erenti-
ation, see e.g. Eaton and Lipsey, 1989), random decision making (or random utility,
see e.g. Anderson, de Palma and Thisse, 1992), which may be due to heterogeneous
information, or previous consumption decisions leading to heterogeneous switching
costs (for other explanations of switching costs see Klemperer, 1995).
In the model, which is described in detail in section 2, I show that there ex-
ists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in prices when there is heterogeneity amongst
4consumers (section 3). I present four formalizations: (1) bounded rational ¯rms
("-maximizers), (2) bounded rational consumers (with an error in the decision rule),
(3) pro¯t maximizing ¯rms which have to reach a minimal market share, (4) rational
consumers and ¯rms with the corresponding existence results in Theorems 1 to 4.
The main results of the paper is Theorem 4.
Under an additional distributional assumption the associated game (with bounded
rational consumers) is log-supermodular and dominance solvable (section 4). Quasi-
supermodularity allows me to show existence which is not based on the convex-
valuedness of the best response correspondence (Proposition 2). In addition, section
4 presents results on comparative statics which are implied by the properties of
the pro¯t functions: higher marginal costs and increased sales taxes imply higher
equilibrium prices of all ¯rms. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
I consider a market with a ¯nite number of di®erentiated goods. The set of goods
is denoted by N = f1;:::;ng.E a c hg o o di 2 N has a price pi > 0. There are other
goods in the economy but their prices are ¯xed. These other goods are captured
by the composite commodity 0 which has the normalized price index p0 ´ 1. The
existence of other markets is important because market expenditure is allowed to
be price-dependent. For ¯xed total income and no other markets this could not be
the case.
Consumers
Ac o n s u m e rw i t h¯ x e di n c o m ew>0 has a utility function with arguments x0;x
where x is the collection of di®erentiated goods x =( xi)i2N 2< n
+. I consider utility
functions according to which discrete choice will result. In particular, I impose that
preferences in the subspace of di®erentiated goods are linear for any given quantity






where µi1 are parameters with µ11 =0( s e eb e l o w ) .
5Each consumer maximizes her utility subject to her budget constraint. This can
be interpreted as going through the following program. She ¯rst decides which good
to buy taking only the relative prices pj=pi, i;j 2 N into account. She buys for
instance good 1 and none of the other di®erentiated goods if logpi ¡logp1 ¸ µ1i for
all i>1. The parameter µij is referred to as a switching point and is the logarithmic
critical price ratio at which a consumer is indi®erent between goods i and j.A tp r i c e s
p a consumer is going to buy good i0 if i0 =i n d e x ( m a x f¡logp1;(µ1i ¡ logpi)i>1g).
The set of switching parameters µij, i;j;k 2 N satis¯es µij = ¡µji, µkj+µji = µki,a n d
µii = 0. Hence, a vector µ1 =( µ12;:::;µ 1n)d e t e r m i n e sa l lµij, which are introduced
in order to make the presentation symmetric for the goods i 6=1 .
At the second step, a consumer chooses according to her utility function u. She
decides on the level of expenditure considering only the price of the good she is
actually buying from.
A consumer is characterized by her utility function u and slopes of the indi®er-
ence curves between the di®erentiated goods fully determined by µ1.S i n c eIw a n t
to work with demand functions which are continuous, I assume that u is contin-
uously di®erentiable. In addition, I assume that consumers always choose in the
interior of the consumption set <2
+ when maximizing u. Note that quasi-linear pref-
erences are ruled out by this assumption. Formally, lime xi!0(@u(e xi;x 0)=@xi)=1
and lime x0!0(@u(xi;e x0)=@x0)=1. This implies that the nonnegativity constraints
x0;x i ¸ 0 are automatically satis¯ed when maximizing the utility function u subject
to pixi + x0 · w.










s.t. p ¢ x + x0 · w s.t. pixi + x0 · w





arg maxxiu(eµi1xi;w¡ pixi)i f l o g pj ¡ logpi ¸ µij for all j>i
and logpj ¡ logpi >µ ij for all j<i
0e l s e .
6To avoid correspondences I assumed that the consumer rather buys from the good
with a smaller index at a relative price equal to the switching point µij.A sc o n s u m e r s
will be assumed to be di®erent and mass points for a distribution over the switching
points will be excluded, demand can be arbitrary at the switching point without
changing the result.
Consumer choice has been derived from utility maximization. As explained be-
low, the approach is compatible with demand functions which are not derived from
utility maximization.
From Individual to Aggregate Demand
Up to now every consumer was described by a collection of switching points µ1,
an income w>0, and a utility function u. Along the lines of Grandmont(1987,
1992, 1993) I de¯ne classes or types of consumers by a speci¯c parametrization
of preferences or demand and consider heterogeneity with respect to a parameter
inside such a class.1 Only di®erences within each class will play a role. Demand
functions are parametrized as follows. A consumer is said to be of type a 2A
if there is a rescaling parameter ¯ 2<such that u(e¡¯x1;x 0) coincides with the
utility function of the base consumer and if the consumer has the same income as
the base consumer. In an abuse of notation I now introduce more arguments into
the utility function. The utility function of a base consumer of type a is written
as u(a;0;x 1;x 0). The value of a utility function of a consumer with parameter ¯
is written as u(a;¯;x1;x 0)=u(a;0;e ¡¯x1;x 0). Conditional demand functions are




Consumers of the same type a have the same conditional demand function ³ up to a
rescaling of the units of measurement. Each consumer of type a can nowbedescribed
by a rescaling parameter ¯, a generating demand function ³, and parameters of
switching µ1. Since I am only working with conditional demand functions ³ it does
not really matter whether they are derived from utility maximization or re°ect, for
1Such a parametrization has been introduced by Mas-Colell and Trockel (1977) and further
used by Dierker, Dierker, and Trockel (1984). See in particular Grandmont (1992) for references
on related literature.
7instance, rules of thumb. Individual demand is
»i(a;¯;µi;p)=Âi(p;µi)³(a;¯ ¡ µi1;p i)





1i f l o g pj ¡ logpi ¸ µij for all j>i
and logpj ¡ logpi >µ ij for all j<i
0e l s e
Consumers of the same income are heterogeneous in two respects. They have
di®erent switching points and their demand functions are di®erent. Assumptions on
the population are formally stated for later reference. (A.1) contains assumptions
on distributions over the switching points (µij)j2N;j6=i.D e n o t e£ i = £j2N;j6=i[µij;µij].
² (A.1). For all i 2 N: there exist continuous distribution functions Gi over
µi 2< n¡1 with Gi(0) = 1=n. Gi has a density gi which is positive and contin-
uously di®erentiable on int £i. gi has bounded support £i, i.e. µij <µ ij for
some j 2 N;j 6= i implies Gi(µi) = 0, and µij > µij for all j 2 N;j 6= i implies
Gi(µi)=1 . gi and @gi(µi)=@µij, j 6= i, are uniformly bounded from above on
int £i.
For convenience, I assume that Gi(0) = 1=n which is not restrictive because
I am free to choose the units of measurement of the di®erentiated goods. I want
to work with twice continuously di®erentiable pro¯t functions. For this reason the
di®erentiability assumptions are made. The assumption that gi is positive on int
£i implies that (@=@µij)Gi(µi) 6=0f o ra l lj 6= i. Hence, I will analyze a model of
\global competition", i.e. a price change of a di®erentiated good has an e®ect on
the demand of all other di®erentiated goods.
I assume that gi, i 2 N has a bounded support because I need that mean expen-
diture on a good turns su±ciently fast to zero for its corresponding price turning to
in¯nity while holding the other prices ¯xed. The assumption of a bounded support
says that for given prices p¡i one can always ¯nd a price pi su±ciently large such that
mean expenditure on good i is equal to zero. I make use of this assumption in order
8to establish bounds for the price-sensitivity of mean expenditure and in order to con-
struct compact strategy sets. For the latter it is convenient but not necessary (see
Caplin and Nalebu®, 1991b, for a result with unbounded support). If the intervals
[µij;µij] degenerated to a single point all consumers would be identical with respect
to the switching point. In such a case also mean expenditure is discontinuous; it is
the Bertrand case with homogeneous goods. On the other hand, if, for all i 2 N, gi
had unbounded support there would be a positive demand left for any price combina-
tion p a n de a c hg o o dw i t hi t si n d e xi nN. The assumption of a rectangular support
is made for convenience; it is only important that the support is convex. Note that
for any price vector p,
P
i2N Gi =1 . D e n o t eµi =( µij;µ i;¡j). @gi(µij;µ i;¡j)=@µij
is de¯ned as limµij&µij @gi(µi)=@µij and @gi(µij;µ i;¡j)=@µij ´ limµij%µij @gi(µi)=@µij.
Partial derivatives of Gi are de¯ned accordingly on the boundary.
Important for the calculations is stochastic independence of the three compo-
nents describing the population of consumers.
² (A.2). a, ¯,a n dµ1 are stochastically independent.
(A.2) implies that consumers in a particular segment of the di®erentiated mar-
ket, formalized by µ1, do not systematically di®er from the rest of the population in
their expenditure functions in the market. The next assumption is made in order
to integrate over individual demand functions.
² (A.3).
(1) A is a separable metric space of types, ¹ is a probability measure on A.
(2) For each type a there exists a conditional distribution over ¯ with density
f.































denotes conditional mean expenditure of type µ1. It will be important to show
that conditional mean expenditure reacts slowly to a price change. In the work of
Dierker (19991) and Caplin and Nalebu® (1991b, subsection 8.2) it was assumed
that conditional mean expenditure is a constant. In this paper I do not make such
an assumption or any shape assumptions on individual demand functions (for a dis-
cussion see the conclusion).
Remark 1 >From the de¯nition of individual demand it follows that conditional








Firm behavior is standard: good i, i 2 N, is produced by ¯rm i with constant
marginal costs ci > 0. Each ¯rm faces a mean demand function Xi(p) depending on
the prices in the market. Each ¯rm is a price setter. The strategic variable, price
pi, is chosen as the best response to the prices of the other ¯rms. For prices above
marginal costs ¯rms will satisfy demand. Pro¯ts are given as
¼i(p)=( pi ¡ ci)Xi(p), i 2 N.
Equilibrium
In the paper I look at pure-strategy Nash equilibria in prices. A pure strategy
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium i sav e c t o ro fp r i c e sp¤ 2< n







¡i) for all pi 2< ++
In other words, p¤
i is an element of the best response correspondence for p¤
¡i.
103 Equilibrium existence and demand heterogene-
ity
The main problem to show existence in models of price competition is to establish
the quasi-concavity of pro¯t functions. I show this property to hold on a compact
set of prices and prove that ¯rms never set prices outside this set. In particular, I
show that heterogeneous demand behavior implies that mean expenditure B(pi;µ i1)
does not depend strongly on its price.
Inserting mean demand into the pro¯t functions gives pro¯t functions which
depend on prices and the characteristics of the market. It will be helpful to consider










The pro¯t function consists of four additive terms. The ¯rst existence result shows
that an oligopoly with pro¯t functions consisting of the ¯rst two terms has an
equilibrium and that the last two terms are negligible under su±cient heterogeneity.
The second result interprets pro¯t functions consisting of the ¯rst three additive
terms as the presented model with the only di®erence that consumers are bounded
rational. The third and fourth result show equilibrium existence for pro¯t functions
as stated in equation (1). I will show that the respective pro¯t functions are quasi-
concave on a compact set of prices. In contrast to Dierker (1991) and Caplin and
Nalebu® (1991b), in speci¯cations 2 to 4 I cannot show that pro¯t functions are
quasi-concave for all prices so that the construction of compact strategy spaces is of
particular importance.
The outline of this section then is as follows: the ¯rst theorem establishes equilib-
rium existence with bounded rational ¯rms (subsection 3.1), the second equilibrium
with bounded rational consumers (subsection 3.2), the third existence result holds
for pro¯t maximizing ¯rms which have to satisfy a minimal market share and the
fourth and main result allows for fully rational consumers and ¯rms without re-
strictions (both subsection 3.3). Theorems 1 to 4 say that if the densities over
11switching parameters are log-concave and if demand behavior is heterogeneous then
there exists an equilibrium.
3.1 Bounded rational ¯rms
Considering the four additive terms of the pro¯t function (1) I start with the ¯rst
term which satis¯es the following concavity property:
Remark 2 The ¯rst term log((pi ¡ ci)=pi) is concave in logpi for all pi >c i.T h e
second derivative with respect to logpi is bounded from above by some negative num-
ber when prices are chosen from a compact strategy space.
The fact of the negative upper bound of the second derivative on a compact
set will be important below. Because of Remark 2 one only has to worry about
the second to fourth term in the pro¯t function (1). In this paper two kinds of
heterogeneity will be important. First, heterogeneity with respect to µi implies that
consumers have di®erent relative prices at which they are indi®erent between a pair
of goods. Second, heterogeneity with respect to u, formalized by a distribution over
¯, will be crucial in making expenditure less price-sensitive in the aggregate than it
is on the individual level.
First, I make an assumption on the heterogeneity of µi in order to take care of
t h es e c o n dt e r mi n( 1 ) .
² (A.4). gi is log-concave in µi, i 2 N.
In particular Caplin and Nalebu® (1991a) discuss which distributions have log-
concave densities. They also give the relevant references. For example the Normal
and, with parameter restrictions, the multivariate Beta distribution have log-concave
densities. Results carry over to truncations with convex support.
Following the work of Dierker (1991) and Caplin and Nalebu® (1991b) also the
second term is log-concave in logarithmic price if the density has this property. This
12result is stated as Lemma 1 (for the proof see the appendix.). One of the aggregation
theorems of Pr¶ ekopa (1973) underlies the result. Dierker (1991) and Caplin and
Nalebu® (1991b)were to my knowledge the ¯rst who applied the aggregation results
of Pr¶ ekopa and Borell to models of imperfect competition.
Lemma 1 Assume (A.1),(A.4). Gi((logpj ¡ logpi)j6=i) is log-concave in logpi.
In this section I analyze pro¯t functions of the form (1) looking for a generalized
version of Nash equilibrium. A pure strategy Bertrand-Nash "-equilibrium is a vector
of prices p¤ 2< n










for all pi 2< ++
Firms are not maximizers but do not bother to change their strategy if such a
deviation increases pro¯ts by a factor " or less. Firms which are "-maximizers can
be labelled bounded rational. The reason for not fully maximizing pro¯ts can be
motivated by measurement errors such as accounting errors (which are proportional
to the level of pro¯t). In the pure Bertrand model Baye and Morgan (1996) obtain
results on "-equilibria (with additive ").
Consequently, equilibrium existence for pro¯t functions, which are the sum of the
¯rst and the second term, implies the existence of "-equilibria if the third and the
fourth term in (1) can be made arbitrarily small. As will be stated by the following
two lemmas this is implied by su±cient heterogeneity with respect to ¯.
Assumption (A.5) says that there is a strict lower bound of expenditure B(pi;µ i1)
for all µi1 2 [µi1;µi1]. This means that the aggregate of consumers with a particular
switching parameter spends a positive minimum budget share in the di®erentiated
market. A similar assumption is also made in Grandmont (1992, 1993) and is needed
in the proofs of several lemmata.
² (A.5). There exists ±>0 such that B(pi;µ i1) ¸ ±W for all pi > 0a n d
µi1 2 [µi1;µi1], i 2 N, i>1.






±(a) > 0, z : A£<£< ++ ¡! < +, implies under (A.4) that there is a lower bound
on individual expenditure for all switching parameters from £. Given a type space
A (A.5) is satis¯ed if (A.4) holds and if there is a subspace A1 µAof positive
measure such that the above equation of conditional demand holds.
With (A.6) I assume uniform integrability over ¯. The average slope in absolute
value m1 serves as a measure of heterogeneity, 0 <m 1 < 1 for distributions with
unbounded support. A small m1 stands for a \°at" distribution and thus for a large
heterogeneity of demand with respect to the parameter ¯ (see Kneip, 1993).
² (A.6). f is continuously di®erentiable with f0 uniformly integrable, i.e. there




0(¯)jd¯ = m1 < 1:
The next lemma puts an arbitrarily small bound on the price elasticity of mean
expenditure B0(pi).


























































The lemma implies that jlogB0(p0
i) ¡ logB0(pi)j can be made arbitrarily small
o nac o m p a c ts e to fp r i c e si ft h ea v e r a g ea b s o l u t ev a l u eo ft h es l o p eo ft h ed e n s i t y
is small, i.e. if m1 is small. When price pi is chosen from a compact strategy set
[ci;z] then, for ¯rm i, deviations from equilibrium pro¯ts are bounded above by the
factor (z ¡ ci)(m1=±) when only the third term is taken into account.





£j2N;j6=i[µij;log pj¡logpi](B(pi;µ i1) ¡ B0(pi))gi(µi)dµi
B0(pi)Gi((logpj ¡ logpi)j2N;j6=i)
!
´ log(1 + R)
which implicitly de¯nes R. This term can be made arbitrarily small if R is close to
zero.
Lemma 3 Under (A.1),(A.2),(A.5),(A.6). Then R can be bounded in absolute
value by any positive number if m1 is su±ciently small, in particular, the bound
(µi1 ¡ µi1)m1=± is never broken by ¯rm i.
Proof. Since by (A.5) B0(pi) is bounded from below it is su±cient to show that
jB(pi;µ i1) ¡ B0(pi)j can be made arbitrarily small. Because of Remark 1, (A.1),
























15Since µi1 has compact support this term can be made arbitrarily small. An explicit















O nac o m p a c ts e to fp r i c e sL e m m a1i su s e dt os h o wt h ee x i s t e n c eo fa ne q u i -
librium for pro¯t functions consisting of terms 1 and 2. With Lemmas 2 and 3 one
can show that such an equilibrium is an "-equilibrium. In the proof I have to show
that ¯rms will choose from a compact set of prices. In order to show this I use that
the switching parameters have a compact support. I de¯ne
logz ´ max
(µ







Theorem 1 says that under the above assumptions an "-equilibrium exists if
consumers are su±ciently heterogeneous with respect to their conditional demand
functions.
Theorem 1 Assume (A.1)-(A.4). There exists an equilibrium for pro¯t functions
¼i(p)=( ( pi ¡ ci)=pi) Gi((logpj ¡ logpi)j6=i). Assume in addition (A.5) and (A.6).
For any ">0 there exists a pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash "-equilibrium if m1 is suf-
¯ciently small.
Proof. First, equilibrium existence for pro¯t functions as the sums of the ¯rst
and second additive term of the right-hand side of (1) is shown for given compact
strategy sets. Lemmata 1 and 4 (the latter in the Appendix) then say that these
pro¯t functions are quasi-concave for given compact strategy sets. In Lemma 5
Kakutani's ¯xed point theorem is applied for given compact strategy sets. Lemma
6 shows that ¯rms will always choose out of these strategy sets. Lemmata 4 to 6
are delegated to the appendix. For compact strategy sets Lemma 2 implies that the
16third term of di®erences of logarithmic pro¯t function (1) can be made arbitrarily
small for m1 su±ciently small. Lemma 3 implies that di®erences in logarithmic pro¯t
functions of the fourth term are arbitrarily small for m1 su±ciently small. Hence,
by Lemmata 2 and 3 an equilibrium strategy for pro¯t functions as the sums of the
¯rst and second term of (1) are "-maximal, ">0, for m1 su±ciently small: De-
note equilibrium pro¯ts of ¯rm i with ¼¤
i and pro¯ts after a price change ¼0
i,d e n o t e
logz0 =l o gz ¡ maxj6=iµij.S i n c ep¤
i · z ad e v i a t i o nt op0
i ¸ z0 cannot be pro¯table.
For p0
i <z 0,l o g¼0
i¡log¼¤
i · (z0¡ci)(m1=±)¡2log(1¡(µi1¡µi1)(m1=±)) · log(1+")
for m1 su±ciently small because log(1 + jRj) < jRj < ¡log(1 ¡j Rj). 2
3.2 Bounded rational consumers
At this point I present and discuss an alternative formulation of consumer behav-
ior which is not fully rational but may be called bounded rational. Consumers
buy according to the same conditional demand function ³(pi;w) independent of the
switching parameters µ.
Each consumer splits the decision problem into two parts (two stage decision
problem): ¯rst how much to demand of a good in the di®erentiated market and
second to decide which of the di®erentiated goods to buy.2 Ex ante goods are
identical, i.e. consumers maximize u(x0;
Pn
i=1 xi) under their budget constraint.
Their demand without an error is »i(p;w)=³(pi;w)i fpi <p j, for all j 6= i,a n d
»i(p;w)=0i fpi >p j, for some j 6= i. Introducing a vector of errors ei, i 2 N,
which is drawn independently across consumers from a probability distribution with
compact support, generates preferences for a particular di®erentiated good. If the
realization of ei > 0, a consumer is willing to pay a higher price for the good than
without error. Consumers do not make systematic errors if Eei =0f o ra l li 2 N.
De¯ne switching points µi1 = e1 ¡ ei. Demand with the error included is assumed
to be of the form »i(p;w)=³(pi;w)i fl o g pi < logpj ¡ µij, for all j 6= i,a n d
»i(p;w)=0i fl o gpi > logpj¡µij, for some j 6= i. This means that consumers derive
demand for good i conditional on buying none of the other di®erentiated goods from
2Note that this corresponds to the two-stage budgeting in applied demand analysis (see e.g.
Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980).
17maximizing u(xi;x 0)s . t . pixi + x0 · w but make an error in the decision which
good to buy, i.e. they do not necessarily buy the cheapest one in the market. This
may be interpreted as a consumer being imperfectly informed about prices when
making the decision which good to buy but once this decision is made (trip to the
¯rm's factory) the consumer observes perfectly the price of the good chosen and
maximizes utility. Errors in the decision rule have been discussed in the literature
e.g. in Tversky (1972). My formulation leads to pro¯t functions
log¼i =l o g
pi ¡ ci
pi
+l o gB0(pi)+l o gGi((logpj ¡ logpi)j6=i): (2)
² (A.7). f is twice continuously di®erentiable with f0 and f00 uniformly inte-









00(¯)jd¯ · m2 < 1:
Under this assumption which is stronger than (A.6), m2 serves as the measure
of demand heterogeneity. The following lemma provides bounds for the price sen-
sitivity of mean expenditure (expressed as elasticity and sensitivity of the elasticity).



















Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 2 I substitute r = ¯ +l o gpi in the expression of














































Theorem 2 Assume (A.1)-(A.5),(A.7). In the model with pro¯t functions (2) there
exists a pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium if m2 is su±ciently small.
Sketch of the proof. Again I have to show that ¯rms will choose from a com-
pact set of prices. In order to show this in Lemma 8 in the appendix, I use that
mean expenditure is bounded, that m2 is su±ciently small, and that the switching
parameters have a compact support. I need that m2 is su±ciently small in the
case that there does not exist a price pi above which the mean expenditure func-
tion B0 is monotone. In the case of monotonicity above some price level, I can do
without m2 being small and bound di®erences in mean expenditure due to the con-
vergence of mean expenditure (which follows from the bounds of mean expenditure).
By Remark 2 the second derivative in logarithmic price of the ¯rst term of (2) is
bounded by some negative number. Hence, since by Lemma 7 the second derivative
of the third term can be made arbitrarily small in absolute value one can show the
quasi-concavity of pro¯t functions for m2 su±ciently small and g log-concave on the
compact set of prices from which ¯rms will choose according to Lemma 8 in the
appendix. 2
Note that in the construction of compact strategy sets (Lemma 8) I use the
condition that m2 is small. This allows me to consider the same compact strategy
set as in the previous subsection. From the argument in part (ii) of the proof of
Proposition 2 below it follows that it is not necessary to assume that m2 is small in
order to construct compact strategy sets.
Remark 3 At this point it seems to be appropriate to discuss the trade-o® between
the two di®erent kinds of heterogeneity. As stated in Remark 2 there exists a negative
19number such that @2 log(pi¡ci)=pi)=(@ logpi)2 is bounded from above by that number
on a compact set. Note that this makes it possible to show equilibrium existence even
if Gi is not log-concave. With pro¯t functions (2) one can show equilibrium existence
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Denote the set of prices P = £i2N[ci;z] \f (pi)i2Njlogpj ¡ logpi · µijg and
denote the Hessian of logGi with Hi ´ (@ijGi)a n d¶ ´ (1;:::;1)T 2< n¡1.N o t e
that Hi is negative semi-de¯nite if and only if logGi concave. The negative semi-




j @ij logGi = ¶THi¶ · 0. Gi is called ~ ·¡strict
log-concave if for the Hessian Hi of logGi the inequality ¶THi¶ ·¡ ~ · holds.
Remark 4 If the second derivative of logGi in logpi is su±ciently negative then
conditional mean expenditure is allowed to react more sensitive on prices, i.e. m2
is not necessarily \small". Hence in order to allow for less demand heterogeneity
(m2 not \small") Gi has to be ~ ·¡strict log-concave. For ~ · big, the inequality cannot
be satis¯ed for densities gi over µi if their supports are \large". Restricting the
support implies that consumers are more homogeneous with respect to their switching
parameters. In addition to the possibility of a big ~ ·, a smaller support of µi makes
the price setting more competitive and the compact set of prices P smaller. Hence,
also the second derivative of the price-cost margin (in logarithms) can be bounded
from above by a negative number which is greater in absolute value as the support is
reduced.
Remark 5 In a duopoly there exist ~ ·>0 such that the assumption of log-concavity
of g1; (A.4), implies that Gi is ~ ·¡strict log-concave if g1(µ) is bounded from below
on [µ;µ], which is for example satis¯ed if g1 is uniform or truncated Normal. This
is shown in the appendix.
20To conclude this subsection, I summarize the previous Remarks 3 and 4 by a
suggestive statement: in order to show existence of equilibrium a less diverse expen-
diture pattern (m2 bigger) has to go hand in hand with less diversity of errors in the
decision rule (support of gi smaller). An additional result on equilibrium existence
is provided in subsection 4.1 below.
3.3 Rational ¯rms and consumers
In this subsection I ¯rst consider pro¯t functions of the form (1) in which ¯rms
are pro¯t maximizers under the constraint that they sell to a minimal share of
consumers, i.e. Gi ¸ ². Afterwards this restriction on the strategies is no longer
imposed.
It will be useful to rewrite pro¯t function (1).










+l o gB0(pi)+l o g
µ
Gi((logpj ¡ logpi)j6=i)+ ( 3 )
Z
£j2N;j6=i[µij;logpj¡logpi]




As is known from Lemma 7 the second derivative of the second term can be made
arbitrarily small. Although Gi is log-concave (by Lemma 1) the third additive term
in (3) is not necessarily concave. To save some space let me denote




B(pi;µ i1) ¡ B0(pi)
B0(pi)
gi(µi)dµi:
In order to show that pro¯t functions are log-concave on a compact support I
have to show that second derivative of log(D(qi)+E(qi)), qi ´ logpi, can be bounded
from above by some positive number arbitrarily close to 0. Hence it has to be shown






















(A.4) implies that (d2D(qi)=dq2
i)D(qi) ¡ (dD(qi)=dqi)2 · 0. Consequently, under




















Without a positive lower bound on D(qi) the right-hand side of this inequality cannot
be bounded from below by some positive number. This implies that without further
assumptions one cannot ¯nd, for all ²>0, an m2 (depending on ²) such that this
inequality is satis¯ed for all prices in P. As shown in Lemma 9 in the appendix, if
there is a positive lower bound for D(qi) one can make the left-hand side arbitrarily
small and bound the right-hand from below by some positive number.
With a minimal market share I obtain a positive lower bound for D(qi). Imposing
a minimal market share is appropriate in markets in which ¯rms have to have a
critical mass in order to survive. Results are una®ected when instead of consumer
mass, expenditure shares, i.e. piXi=(
P
j pjXj) ¸ ², or demand shares are considered.
One justi¯cation can be that ¯rms are run by managers and managerial incentives
include minimal market share (due to dynamic considerations). Such markets also
include markets with strong network externalities where there exists a critical market
size below which consumers do not ¯nd the product useful.3
If the cost di®erences of the ¯rms are su±ciently similar with respect to the
consumer tastes, there exist minimal market share such that ¯rms can make pro¯t
whatever the prices (above marginal costs) of the competitors are.
3This motivation leads to problems when formalized: the pro¯t function of low price ¯rms
would need modi¯cations because these ¯rms can push a competitor below critical size and thus
discontinuously increase their demand. Hence in order to translate my result into a model with
network externalities the discontinuity must be su±ciently small and su±ciently distant from any
equilibrium price vector.
22² (A.8) There exists a '>0 such that
logcj ¡ logci 2 (µij + ';µij ¡ ');i;j2 N;i < j
Theorem 3 Assume (A.1)-(A.5),(A.7),(A.8). There exist minimal market shares
such that the model with minimal market shares has a pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash
equilibrium in which all ¯rms are active if m2 is su±ciently small.
Sketch of Proof. Similar to the one of Theorem 2. (A.8) implies that all ¯rms
are active in any candidate equilibrium and can reach some minimal budget shares
²i given prices above marginal costs by the competitors, Gi(logcj ¡ logci)=²i ¸
Gi((µij +')j6=i). Due to Remark 2 and Lemmata 4, 7, and 9 (in the Appendix) one
can show the quasi-concavity of pro¯t function on a compact set of prices if m2 is
su±ciently small. In order to bound the second derivative of log(D(qi)+E(qi)) by
a positive number arbitrarily small on a compact set for m2 su±ciently small I need
the log-concavity of Gi, arbitrarily small bounds on di®erences jB(pi;µ i1)¡B0(pi)j,
and ¯rst and second derivatives, and uniform bounds for gi and its partial deriva-
tives. By Lemma 10 in the Appendix there exists such a compact set in which the
prices of pro¯t-maximizing ¯rms stay whatever the price-setting of the competitors.
2
With this result equilibrium existence is proved in a world with rational ¯rms and
consumers. The trade-o® between the di®erent kinds of heterogeneity as pointed out
i nR e m a r k s3a n d4a l s oh o l d si nt h i sc a s e .Ia s s u m e dt h a t¯ r m ss a t i s f yam i n i m a l
market share. This restriction on the strategy set can be avoided under a stronger
assumption on Gi. Since the distribution function Gi takes any value between 0 and




















This inequality holds for prices such that a ¯rm has a negligible market share
under the following assumption:
23² (A.9). gi is uniformly bounded from below on int £i, i 2 N.
This assumption implies that @Gi((qj ¡ qi)j6=i)=@qi evaluated at µi 2f µi 2
£ij9j 6= i : µij = µijg is bounded away from zero and so is dD(qi)=dqi.F o r e x -
ample, any truncated Normal distribution on £i satis¯es (A.9).
Under the additional assumption (A.9) equilibrium existence can be shown with-
out the restriction of minimal market shares. I now state the main result of the
paper. Like the previous results it formalizes the idea that aggregation reduces the
price sensitivity of market expenditure and log-concave densities imply shape re-
strictions on the demand for each di®erentiated good so that pro¯t functions are
\well-behaved" on a su±ciently large set of prices. It is the last step to show that
this idea is compatible with fully rational consumers and ¯rms without the need to
impose any restrictions on the ¯rms' strategy spaces.
Theorem 4 Assume (A.1)-(A.5),(A.7),(A.9). There exists a pure-strategy Bertrand-
Nash equilibrium if m2 is su±ciently small.
Sketch of Proof. Follows from the proofs of Lemmata 9 and 10, Theorem 3 and
the argument above. 2
To summarize this section, I provide a table which presents the assumptions for
the results in the di®erent speci¯cations.
speci¯cation assumptions
"-maximizing ¯rms (3.1) (A.1)-(A.6), m1 \small"
bounded rational consumers (3.2) (A.1)-(A.5),(A.7), m2 \small"
¯rms with minimal market share (3.3) (A.1)-(A.5),(A.7),(A.8), m2 \small"
rational consumers and ¯rms (3.3) (A.1)-(A.5),(A.7),(A.9), m2 \small"
Table I: existence of equilibrium
4 Further results with bounded rational consumers
In this section I derive further results on existence, uniqueness, and monotone com-
parative statics in which I make use of the properties of market demand. I restrict
24the analysis to the simplest case in which uniqueness can be obtained, i.e. I consider
the case in which consumers are bounded rational and make errors in the decision
making as speci¯ed in subsection 3.2. For the speci¯cations in subsection 3.3 the
analysis is more complicated but possible along the same lines in order to show
uniqueness.
4.1 On equilibrium existence and uniqueness
For more than two ¯rms, I assume in addition that the distribution functions Gi
satisfy the weakly dominant diagonal property de¯ned below. This implies that the
associated game is quasi-supermodular (Proposition 1). Equilibrium existence can
then be shown independent of the demand heterogeneity measured by m2 (Propo-
sition 2). Assuming that di®erences in marginal costs lie in the support of the
distribution over the switching points guarantees that all ¯rms are active and make
pro¯ts in an equilibrium. The uniqueness of the equilibrium (Theorem 5) is then
proved by showing that logarithmic payo® functions satisfy the dominant diagonal
property. The game is dominance solvable.
It is convenient to write the model as the game ¡ = fN;P;(¼i;i2 N)g where
N is the ¯nite set of ¯rms, ¼i the pro¯t function of ¯rm i,a n dP is the set of
strategy pro¯les, which was de¯ned as £i2N[ci;z] \f (pi)i2Njlogpj ¡ logpi · µijg.
Denote Pi(p¡i) the strategy set of ¯rm i given p¡i.W h e np r i c e si nP are replaced
by logarithmic prices the set is denoted by Q. The game with log-pro¯ts as payo®
functions and logarithmic strategy sets is denoted by ¡0 = fN;Q;(log¼i;i2 N)g.
It will be shown that the model is a particular log-supermodular game.
T h eg a m e¡ 0 is smooth supermodular if Q is a complete lattice and log¼i is
twice di®erentiable with @2 log¼i(p)=@ logpi@ logpj ¸ 0, for all i;j 2 N, j 6= i,a n d
p 2 P (Topkis' Characterization Theorem). The game ¡0 exhibits strong strategic
complementarity if @2 log¼i=@ logpi@ logpj > 0, for all i;j 2 N, j 6= i and p 2 P.4
4The fruitfulness of the theory of supermodular games for economics has been recognized by
Vives (1990) and Milgrom and Roberts (1990b). One of the standard examples are simple models
of price competition with di®erentiated products. In the present framework strategy sets depend on
the choices of the other players which does not create any problems here (for a de¯nition and some
results see e.g. Milgrom and Roberts, 1990a). For an interpretation of strategic complementarity
25In this section I introduce an additional assumption on the distribution of the
µi, i 2 N.R e c a l lt h a thi
kj is an element of the Hessian of logGi.









By Lemma 1 it follows from (A.4) that Gi log-concave, which implies that hi
jj ·
0. If the cross derivatives hi
kj > 0 at some point, then hi
jj needs to be su±ciently
negative for the weakly dominant diagonal to hold. Note also that in the case of a
duopoly the log-concavity of Gi, n =1 ;2, implies that (A.10) is trivially satis¯ed.
The ¯rst result says that under the additional assumption (A.10) the game ¡ is
quasi-supermodular.
Proposition 1 Assume (A.1)-(A.4),(A.7),(A.10). The game ¡0 is smooth super-
modular on P.
Proof. I check the conditions for smooth supermodularity of ¡0.G i v e n p¡i,e a c h
price is chosen from a compact interval in <+. By construction, Q is a complete
lattice. For i 2 N,l o g¼i is twice continuously di®erentiable (by the assumption of
di®erentiability and due to the construction of Q). Cross derivatives are
@2 log¼i
@ logpi@ logpj






















see also Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985).
26by (A.10) and Lemma 11 in the Appendix which says that Gi is log-concave in logpj
on its support. 2
Note that quasi-supermodularity can be shown on any set which is a complete
lattice and which is a subset of £i2N[ci;1) \f pjlogpj ¡ logpi · µijg.N o t e a l s o
that neither (A.5) nor m2 \small" are assumed. This implies that one can show
equilibrium existence independent of the individual conditional demand functions
in the population although pro¯t functions are not necessarily quasi-concave (even
on a compact set such as P) if one can ¯nd a compact set of strategy pro¯les. This
is always possible.
Proposition 2 Assume (A.1)-(A.4),(A.7),(A.10). There exists a pure-strategy
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in the speci¯cation with bounded rational consumers.
The proof is delegated to the appendix and is based on Tarski's ¯xed point theo-
rem. In the duopoly, the result is more general than Theorem 2. For more than two
¯rms (A.10) is not implied by log-concavity of gi and the assumption on switching
parameters (A.10) replaces assumptions on the heterogeneity of conditional demand
functions. Along the same lines equilibrium existence can also be shown in speci¯-
cation 1 with bounded rational ¯rms.
Below I establish the uniqueness of equilibrium. The following assumption says
that marginal costs of the ¯rms are not allowed to be too di®erent.
² (A.11). logcj ¡ logci 2 (µij;µij), i;j 2 N;i < j.
(A.11) is weaker than (A.8). Under the assumption corner solutions can be ex-
cluded, i.e. all ¯rms i 2 N will have positive market shares in equilibrium charging
prices above there marginal costs and thus make pro¯ts.
Lemma 12 Assume (A.1)-(A.3),(A.11). If there is a pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash
equilibrium all ¯rms are active and make positive pro¯ts in equilibrium.
27Proof. Suppose that exactly one ¯rm is inactive and show that this cannot be an
equilibrium. The same argument applies for more than one inactive ¯rm.
(i) Assume ¯rst that the inactive ¯rm i chooses a price pi above marginal costs such
that the other ¯rms together serve the whole market. They will choose their prices
such that logpj ¡logpi = µij for all j 6= i. Such a price pi cannot be a best response
for ¯rm i because by decreasing its price it can make positive pro¯ts.
(ii) Let ¯rm i choose its price equal to marginal costs so that the competitors can
only serve the whole market by setting some of the prices below marginal costs.
This cannot be a best response of all competitors. They will set their prices above
marginal cost because they still can obtain some share of the market. In such a
situation it cannot be optimal for ¯rm i to charge a price equal to marginal cost.
(iii) Clearly, ¯rms do not set prices below marginal costs in equilibrium because at
least one of these ¯rms has a positive market share and thus makes losses. 2
Consequently, for m2 su±ciently small every equilibrium price p¤ 2 int P and
the analysis can be restricted to prices in P.
Lemma 13 says that if there is su±cient heterogeneity of demand behavior mea-
sured by small m2, log-pro¯ts satisfy the dominant diagonal property. It is the last
step to show uniqueness of the equilibrium. The proof is delegated to the appendix.
Lemma 13 Assume (A.1)-(A.5),(A.7),(A.10),(A.11). If m2 su±ciently small, then









(p)j for i;j 2 N, j 6= i.
If (A.10) is strengthened by making the left-hand side of the inequality by some
² greater than the right-hand side one can allow for less demand heterogeneity, i.e.
m2 can be greater. Proposition 1 and Lemma 13 put together give the uniqueness
of equilibrium. A game is called dominance solvable if there exists only one serially
undominated strategy pro¯le.
28Theorem 5 Assume (A.1)-(A.5),(A.7),(A.10),(A.11) and m2 su±ciently small.
The pure strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium p¤ is unique. The original game ¡
is dominance solvable.
Proof. By Lemmata 8 and 12 there does not exist an equilibrium outside the
interior of P. Furthermore, prices outside P cannot belong to the set of serially
undominated strategy pro¯les. In particular, one can use the proof of Lemma 8
in order to show that any price vector p with some component pi >z , i 2 N,i s
serially dominated. On P the dominant diagonal property holds. It implies that
there exists a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium p¤ in the game ¡0. Since, in
addition, the game is smooth supermodular it is dominance solvable by Milgrom and
Roberts (1990b, Theorem 5). Since serially undominated strategies are obtained by
ordinal comparison and the transformation of the payo® functions is strictly increas-
ing, the strategy pro¯le p¤ is the unique serially undominated strategy pro¯le of the
game ¡ and, consequently, the unique pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. 2
It is well known that dominance solvability gives a strong prediction of play.
In particular, only serially undominated strategies can be rationalizable (as de¯ned
by Bernheim, 1984) and only serially undominated strategies can be played with
positive probability at a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, mixed-strategy Nash equi-
librium or correlated equilibrium (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1991, on rationality
requirements for the ¯rms to play the dominance solution see Tan and Werlang,
1988). Hence, p¤ i st h eu n i q u er a t i o n a l i z a b l es t r a t e g yp r o ¯ l ea n dt h e r ea r en oo t h e r
mixed-strategy Nash or correlated equilibria.
4.2 Monotone comparative statics
In the second part of this section I provide comparative statics results. Equilibrium
prices are weakly increased as unit costs of one ¯rm rise or as output taxes are
increased. Under strong strategic complementarity they are strongly increased.
To obtain comparative statics results I look at a family of games. Let the payo®
29functions and strategy sets be parametrized by a parameter ¿ 2< K. Games in this
family di®er only in the value ¿ takes. Denote Qi(q¡i) ¸ Q0
i(q¡i) if the maximal and
the minimal element of Qi(q¡i) is larger than or equal to the corresponding element
in Q0
i(q¡i):
Suppose that ¡0(¿)=fN;Q(¿);(log¼i(¢;¿);i 2 N);¿ 2< Kg is a family of
smooth supermodular games satisfying @2 log¼i=@ logpi@¿k ¸ 0f o ra l li;k and let
Qi(q¡i;¿)b eac o m p a c ti n t e r v a li n<.I fl o g p¤(¿) is the unique pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium of the game then it is easy to show that ¿k ¸ ¿0
k for all k and Qi(q¡i;¿) ¸
Qi(q¡i;¿0)f o ra l li imply that p¤(¿) ¸ p¤(¿0) (by Theorem 5 in Milgrom and Roberts,
1990a, and Theorem 6 in combination with Theorem 5 in Milgrom and Roberts,
1990b, see also Cooper and John, 1988).
A family of games ¡0(¿) exhibits multiplier e®ects in the parameter ¿k if the
optimal reaction of each player is larger than its optimal reaction given the strategies
of the other players, i.e. if dlogp¤
j=d¿k >d logp¤
j=d¿kjp¡i ¸ 0 for all ¯rms and
> 0 for at least one ¯rm. It is easy to show the following result: assume that
a family of games ¡(¿) has a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for each ¿,
is smooth supermodular, exhibits strong strategic complementarity, and satis¯es
@2 log¼i=@ logpi@¿k ¸ 0 for all i;k with strict inequality for at least one ¯rm and let
all strategy sets be nondecreasing in ¿ then the family of games exhibits multiplier
e®ects. The magnitude of the multiplier e®ect depends on the sensitivity of strategy
choices to shocks and on the strength of strategic complementarities.
The ¯rst comparative statics result is obtained for changes in the marginal
cost cj of ¯rm j. What happens to equilibrium prices p¤ when unit cost cj is
increased for some j 2 N? I look at the family of games ¡0(cj)=fN;Q(cj),
(log¼i(p;cj);i2 N);c j 2 [cj;cj]g where Qi(q¡i;cj) is the strategy set of ¯rm i.U n -
der the assumptions of Theorem 5 (with (A.10) valid for the range of cost parameters
under consideration), equilibrium prices p¤ are nondecreasing functions of unit cost
cj of ¯rm j 2 N because for cm >c 0
m, Qi(q¡i;cj) ¸ Qi(q¡i;c0
j)f o ra l li 2 N and
@2 log¼i
@ logpi@cj





(pj ¡ cj)2 > 0:
30If, in addition, Hi, i 2 N, has a strict dominant diagonal then the game ¡0 ex-
hibits strong strategic complementarities and the family of games exhibits multiplier
e®ects: a cost shock to one single ¯rm is transmitted into price increases of all ¯rms
in the market.
Suppose that the revenue of ¯rm i is taxed by a tax t per unit of output sold.
Pro¯ts of ¯rm i are
¼i(p;t)=
pi ¡ t ¡ ci
pi
B0(pi)G((logpj ¡ logpi)j6=i)
For ¯rm i the tax simply is an additional cost. If assumption (A.10) is adjusted such
that unit costs including tax satisfy (A.10) for t 2 [0;t], equilibrium prices p¤ are
nondecreasing functions of the tax per unit t, t 2 [0;t]. If one requires in addition
the strict dominant diagonal of Hi, i 2 N, then the family of games ¡(t) exhibits
multiplier e®ects. The result remains unchanged if ¯rms face di®erent taxes. Results
are analogous in the case of revenue taxes.
If pro¯ts are taxed or the mass of consumers changes (i.e., multiplicative change),
equilibrium prices are una®ected. An additive demand shock leads to monotone
comparative statics but it is not clear what this shock means in terms of the variables
at the individual level.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In models of imperfect competition the existence of equilibrium is far from guar-
anteed. Previous literature has looked at discrete choice models under particular
functional form assumptions of individual demand. In this paper I replace func-
tional form assumptions by heterogeneity of demand behavior. In particular, I show
that aggregation along the lines of Grandmont is compatible with the discrete choice
setup which is widely used in the theoretical and empirical literature. Future re-
search has to show whether a more general version of aggregation can give rise to
restrictions which are useful for the analysis of markets in which ¯rms strategically
interact. To summarize the main ¯ndings of this paper, aggregation of a heteroge-
neous population of consumers leads to quasi-concave pro¯t functions on a compact
set of prices and this property is used to show existence of equilibrium.
31Some modi¯cations can be accommodated. As remarked in section 2, I analyzed
a model of global competition in which each ¯rm's price change has an e®ect on
the demand of each competitor. The model is easily adjusted to allow for localized
competition in which each ¯rm only competes directly with a strict subset of the set
of all competitors (this set can depend on the price vector p). For instance in a one-
dimensional model of product di®erentiation each ¯rm has at most two neighbors
(under a convexity assumption in the utility function, see e.g. Anderson, de Palma,
and Thisse, 1992). In such a model one can index ¯rms such that ¯rm i competes
directly with ¯rms i ¡ 1a n di + 1 if all ¯rms are active. Some assumptions on
the costs of production imply that all ¯rms are active in any candidate equilibrium.
Consider the hypothetical pro¯t function ~ ¼i(pi¡1;p i;p i+1)o f¯ r mi when it is ignoring
the presence of all other ¯rms other than its direct neighbors. If ¯rm i prices its
good such that ¯rm i¡1o r¯ r mi+1isoutofthemark et¼i(p) · ~ ¼i(pi¡1;p i;p i+1).
Hence, the critical part of the proof of equilibrium existence is the quasi-concavity
of pro¯t functions ~ ¼i(pi¡1;p i;p i+1). Results are analogous to the ones derived in this
paper (see also Peitz, 1998). In environments where vertical elements of product
di®erentiation such as quality play a role one might want to allow for a correlation
between a, ¯,a n dµ1. Such an extension is possible for particular speci¯cations.
The model allows for unrestricted individual demand functions. Alternatively,
one might want to work with shape restrictions on individual demand which are
preserved under aggregation (this corresponds to assumptions on the third derivative
of the utility function). This has been done by Dierker (1991, Proposition 6) who
provides a more general condition on individual demand than unit elastic demand
which is for instance satis¯ed by CES utility functions. If mean demand of each type
µ1 is log-concave in logarithmic price on a set of consumers of measure 1, i.e. for a
subset of £1 which is of full measure the price elasticity of the mean demand of type
µ1 is nonincreasing, equilibrium existence can be shown without the heterogeneity
assumptions (m1 or m2 small) made in this paper.
In addition to the results on equilibrium existence, a su±cient condition for dom-
inance solvability has been provided, which implies monotone comparative statics
results. It should be pointed out that an initial price vector converges to the unique
equilibrium price vector of the stage-game under a large class of learning rules (see
Milgrom and Roberts, 1991). Suppose for example that learning is \slow", i.e. in
32period t ¯rms deviate with positive probability from the previous price p
t¡1
i .I ft h i s
deviation is the best response to p
t¡1
¡i , prices will converge to p¤ in a probabilistic
sense as time goes to in¯nity (this result can be generalized).
33Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 . (see Dierker, 1991). Take i = 1. Analogously for i>1.
De¯ne the convex sets
C1 = fµ1jµ1j · logpj ¡ logp1;µ 1j 2 [µ1j;µ1j] for all j 2 N;j 6=1 g;
~ C1 = fµ1jµ1j · logpj;µ 1j 2 [µ1j;µ1j] for all j 2 N;j 6=1 g:
De¯ne ~ g1(µ12;:::;µ 1n;logp1)=g1(µ12 +l o gp1;:::;µ 1n +l o gp1). Since logg1 is con-














By Theorem 6 of Pr¶ ekopa(1973) G1 is a log-concave function of logp1. 2
Lemma 4 Assume (A.1)-(A.4). Pro¯ts ((pi ¡ ci)=pi)Gi((logpj ¡ logpi)j6=i) are
quasi-concave in its own price.
Proof. Let me ¯rst show that pro¯t is strictly log-concave in its logarithmic price
where demand is strictly positive and price larger marginal cost. Consider ¯rm 1.
The proof goes through for all i 2 N.L e m m a1s a y st h a tG1 is log-concave in logp1.
log(p1 ¡ c1) ¡ logp1 is strictly concave in logp1 (see Remark 1).
Now look at quasi-concavity of pro¯ts for all cases. Quasi-concavity is violated if
there exists a pi0, pi1,a n dpi¸ with ci · pi0 <p i1and pi¸ = ¸pi0+(1¡¸)pi1, ¸ 2 (0;1)
such that
(pi0 ¡ ci)Gi((logpj ¡ logpi0)j6=i) > (pi¸ ¡ ci)Gi((logpj ¡ logpi¸)j6=i)
and (pi1 ¡ ci)Gi((logpj ¡ logpi1)j6=i) > (pi¸ ¡ ci)Gi((logpj ¡ logpi¸)j6=i)
34Two cases remain to be considered.
Case i) pi0 = ci. The ¯rst inequality requires that pi¸ <c i which is a contradiction.
Case ii) pi0 >c i.K e e p p¡i ¯xed. For Gi((logpj ¡ logpi1)j6=i) = 0 the second in-
equality requires pi¸ <c i which is a contradiction. I already showed that pro¯t is
log-concave in its logarithmic price where demand is strictly positive and price larger
marginal cost. As the logarithmic function is monotonic pro¯ts are quasi-concave.
2
De¯nition The best response correspondence R is de¯ned as
R : £i2N[ci;z] ¡! £ i2N[ci;z]








i ;p ¡i)=m a x pi : ¼(pi;p ¡i)g\[ci;z]i f 6= ;
fzg else.
Lemma 5 Let pro¯t functions be quasi-concave in their own price. There exists a
pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium for ci · pi · z.
Proof. The best response correspondence R is a correspondence with compact
convex domain into itself. Since pro¯t functions are continuous the best response
correspondence is upper-hemicontinuous. The quasi-concavity of the pro¯t func-
tions guarantees that R is convex-valued. Hence, one can make use of Kakutani's
¯xed point theorem which says that there exists a p¤ such that p¤ 2 R(p¤). 2




¡i) where ¼i(p)=( ( pi ¡ ci)=pi)Gi((logpj ¡ logpi)j6=i).




Case i). If there were a j, j 6= i,w i t hl o gp¤
j · logz + µij then ¼i(pi;p ¤
¡i) = 0 for all




Case ii). logz+µij · logp¤
j for all j, j 6= i. pi >z¸ p¤





j ¡ logpi)j2N;j6=i) ·
pi ¡ ci
npi
35because Gi(0) = 1=n ¸ Gi((logp¤
j ¡ logpi)j2N;j6=i). For logpi ¸ logp¤
j ¡ µij,f o r
some j, one has Gi((logp¤
j ¡ logpi)j2N;j6=i) = 0. Thus one must have, for all j,
logpi < logp¤
j ¡µij which is equivalent to pi <p ¤




















for all j.S e t l o g p0
i =m i n f(logp¤
j ¡ µij)jg and denote the index of the minimal


















It is not in the interest of the ¯rm to set pi >z¸ p¤


































(=l o g p
¤
k > logz + µik
Since this inequality is satis¯ed, a deviation from p¤






¡i)f o rpi >z . This holds for all i 2 N. 2
Lemma 8 Assume (A.1)-(A.3),(A.5). For m2 su±ciently small, there is no pi >z ,
i 2 N, such that ¼i(pi;p ¤
¡i) >¼ i(p¤
i;p ¤
¡i) in the speci¯cation with bounded rational
consumers.




Case i). As in the proof of Lemma 6.
Case ii). Part (i) following the proof of Lemma 6. logz+µij · logp¤
j for all j, j 6= i.
pi >z¸ p¤






j ¡ logpi)j2N;j6=i) · (pi ¡ ci)
B0(pi)
npi
36because 1=n ¸ Gi((logp¤
j ¡ logpi)j2N;j6=i). As in the proof of Lemma 6 one must
have, for all j,l o gpi < logp¤
j ¡µij which is equivalent to pi <p ¤
j=eµij.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,


















+l o gB0(pi) ¡ logn
for all j.S e t l o g p0
i =m i n f(logp¤
j ¡ µij)jg and denote the index of the minimal


















It is not in the interest of the ¯rm to set pi >z¸ p¤






































@ log e pi
¯ ¯
¯





>From the de¯nition of pi and p0
i it follows that logpi¡logp0
i · µij¡2 µij. Hence, for
any ²>0 one can ¯nd an m2 su±ciently small such that jlogB0(pi) ¡ logB0(p0
i)j <




























µik ¡ (1 + ²)e
µik
´
(=l o g p
¤
k > logz + µik
for m2 su±ciently small. (From the proof of Lemma 6 it is clear that at two di®erent






¡i) for pi >z . This holds for all i 2 N. 2
P r o o fo fR e m a r k5 .




h(µ)dµ where h(µ)=l o gg1(µ)

























h(~ µ) ¡ e
h(µ):
Hence, ¡eh(~ µ)eh(µ) = ¡g1(~ µ)g1(µ) ·¡ ~ · because g1 is bounded from below on its
support. 2
Lemma 9 Assume (A.1)-(A.5), (A.7). The third additive term on the right-hand
side of equation (3) can be bounded in absolute value by any positive number for m2
su±ciently small.
Proof. (i) As shown in the text, the third additive term on the right-hand side of
equation (3) can be made arbitrarily small in absolute value if for any ² one can ¯nd
an m2 such that inequality (5) is satis¯ed. Since ¯rms have to satisfy a minimal
market share D(qi) ¸ °.T h i si m p l i e st h a t²(D(qi)+E(qi))2 >² (D(qi)¡jE(qi)j)2 >
e ²>0i fjE(qi)j can be made arbitrarily small.
(ii) jE(qi)j can be made arbitrarily small: for any positive number one can ¯nd




























Hence, ²(D(qi) ¡j E(qi)j)2 ¸ ²(1 ¡ m2
± (µi1 ¡ µi1))2°2 > e ² for m2 su±ciently small.
(iii) It remains to be shown that the left-hand side of inequality (5) can be made
































































Remark that D(qi) · 1. By (A.1) gi and its partial derivatives are uniformly
bounded from above. This implies that jdD(qi)=dqij and jd2D(qi)=dq2
ij are uni-
formly bounded from above. It remains to be shown that jE(qi)j, jdE(qi)=dqij,a n d
jd2E(qi)=dq2
ij can be made arbitrarily small. From part (ii) it follows that jE(qi)j
can be made arbitrarily small.























B(eqi;µ i1) ¡ B0(eqi)
B0(eqi)
gi(µi1;:::;µ i;j¡1;q j ¡ qi;µ i;j+1;:::;µ in)dµi1 ¢¢¢dµi;j¡1dµi;j+1 ¢¢¢dµin
A ss h o w ni np a r t( i i )o ft h ep r o o fj(B(pi;µ i1) ¡ B0(pi))=B0(pi)j c a nb em a d ea r b i -
trarily small. Since by (A.1) gi is uniformly bounded from above it remains to be










































With the same argument as for dB0(pi)=dlogpi in the proof of Lemma 7 also



















which can be made arbitrarily small for m2 su±ciently small.
(v) Finally, also jd2E(qi)=dq2
ij can be made arbitrarily small. The analysis
is lengthy and easily carried out along the lines of part (iv) above. Note that
by (A.1) gi and its partial derivatives are uniformly bounded in absolute value.
With the bounds provided in parts (ii) and (iv), it only remains to be shown that




























































Each of the additive terms in parentheses can be made arbitrarily small and the
result follows. 2
Lemma 10 Assume (A.1)-(A.3),(A.5). For m2 su±ciently small, there is no pi >z ,
i 2 N, such that ¼i(pi;p ¤
¡i) >¼ i(p¤
i;p ¤
¡i) in the speci¯cations of subsection 3.3.
Proof. I follow the proof of Lemma 8 with pro¯t functions in equation (3) using
the same de¯nitions of prices pi and p0































i)+l o g( 1+E(logp
0
i))
As shown in part (ii) of the proof of Lemma 8 jlogB0(pi) ¡ logB0(p0
i)j can be made
arbitrarily small. As shown in part (ii) of the proof of Lemma 9 jE(logpi)j can
be made arbitrarily small for any pi. Consequently, for any ²0 one can ¯nd an m2





i)j)+l o g( 1+njE(logpi)j) <²
0:





















which follows from the proof of Lemma 8 where ² has to be replaced by ²0. 2
Lemma 11 Assume (A.1),(A.4). Gi((logpj ¡ logpi)j6=i) is log-concave in logpj,
j 6= i.
Proof. (following Proposition 5 by Dierker, 1991, for n ¯rms). Take i =1 .A n a l -
ogously for i>1. Take j = 2. Analogously for i 6=1 ,j 6= i. De¯ne the convex
set
¸ C12 = fµ1jµ12 ·¡logp1;µ 1k · logpk ¡ logp1; for k ¸ 3;
µ1j 2 [µ1j;µ1j] for all j 2 N;j 6=1 g:
De¯ne ¸ g12(µ12;:::;µ 1n;logp2)=g1(µ12 ¡ logp2;µ 13;:::;µ 1n). Since logg1 is concave














By Theorem 6 of Pr¶ ekopa(1973) G1 is a log-concave function of logp2. 2
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) By Tarski's ¯xed point theorem and Proposition
1 there exists a ¯xed point in e ¡=fN; e Q;(log¼i;i 2 N)g where e Q is a complete
lattice which is a subset of £i2N[logci;1)\flogpjlogpj¡logpi · µijg. e P is de¯ned
accordingly. Such a ¯xed point is an equilibrium on e P.I tr e m a i n st ob es h o w nt h a t
one can construct a set e P such that an equilibrium given the restricted set of strategy
pro¯les e P is also an equilibrium given the set of strategy pro¯les <n
++.
(ii) Denote ¢max =m a x f(µij ¡ µij)i;jg.N o t e t h a t B0(pi) · W.F o r pi ¸ pi,
denote B0(pi;pi)=m a x b pi2[pi;pi] B0(b pi). By construction, the function B0(¢;pi)i s
nondecreasing in pi.H e n c e ,B0(¢;pi) converges to some value in [0;W]a spi turns
to in¯nity for any value of pi. This limit is nonincreasing in pi. Hence, given B0 for
any ²>0 there exist prices e pi such that logB0(pi; e pi) ¡ logB0(e pi; e pi) < log(1 + ²)
for any pi 2 [e pi; e pi +¢ max ¡ µij]( 8 i 2 N 9j 6= i). Denote the sets of these prices
e pi by P +(²). Fix for the moment ².D e n o t e z0 = e pi +¢ max.T h e s e t P+(²)i s
a union of intervals and is unbounded. For some e pi 2 P+(²) construct compact
strategy sets e P = £i2N[ci;z0) \f (pi)i2Njlogpj ¡ logpi · µijg.D e n o t ee Pi(p¡i)=
fpij(pi;p ¡i) 2 e Pg. The result is shown if ¯rms do not set prices outside the set
e Pi(p¤
¡i). Only prices pi with z0 ¡ µij ¸ pi ¸ z0 have to be considered because other
prices outside e Pi(p¤
¡i) lead to zero or negative pro¯ts. If there is an equilibrium
in e P with logp¤
j · logz0 + µij for some j 6= i then ¼i(pi;p ¤





j > logz0 + µij for all j 6= i.
Clearly, at a price e pi, Gi((logp¤
j ¡ log e pi)j6=i)=1 . S i n c ep¤ is an equilibrium price
vector in e P,o n eh a s
¼i(p









A pro¯t maximizing deviation has to be a price pi such that z0 ¡ µij ¸ pi ¸ z0 for





















It can now be shown that such a deviation is not pro¯table for ²>0s u ± c i e n t l y











e pi +¢ max ¡ µij
¶
+l o gB0 (pi) ¡ logn












+l o g ( 1+²)
because B0(e pi)=B0(e pi; e pi)a n dB0(pi) · B0(pi; e pi). 2






((qj ¡ qi)j2N;j6=i) ¸ 0








It remains to be shown that
¡
@2 log¼i





(pi ¡ ci)2 ¡
d2 logBi(pi)
(dlogpi)2 > 0 for i 2 N.
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